Ukraine War thread.

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  • From a recent conversation with an amcit in Russia, it comes down to money:

    Q:I guess the big question is if the conscripts from last year will get to go home or if they'll get served and mobilized immediately as they've completed their training and become eligible.

    Depends on whether or not they agree to sign on, which many do.
    Because the pay is nuts compared to averages in their regions.
    E.g you come from Omsk, avg salary is like 30k RUB, and you get 250-300k for your service.

    Q: Weren't there a lot of complaints about next of kin not getting promised payments? Or has that since been resolved?

    Haven't heard of that happening regularly.
    Like, I get that reddit and such like to imagine the payment for your dead family member is like a sack of potatoes or something but it's just their pension and cash sum earned so far.
    Personal anecdote, a girl I know had her cousin serve, came back with 1.5 million in his pocket, apparently caused a bit of a stir in his local community and a decent amount of men signed up.

    This is in Krasnodar.

    Keep in mind that not paying your dues is bad PR and it will go on to national TV there, resulting into actions quickly because they don't want to demoralize people from signing contracts.

    Like, earning 1.5 million in less than a year is mega mega rare and for a 21yo with no education that's insane opportunity

    Iirc the guy went back later.

    The last thing they're going to cut is that monetary aspect, as it guarantees recruits, especially as the population becomes poorer.

    The worse the economy is, the more people sign on.

    As long as they keep paying the high salaries the MOD is going to keep getting recruits regardless of how Russia performs on the battlefield. Though as the economy deteriorates that might actually cause more recruits based on how little economic opportunity some areas have.
    ------

    From what I heard (directly from a relative who has worked in PMC's in the past there), they offer 3k a month in dollars.

    And obviously 3k USD is a big, big sum in Russia. It's multiple months of salary for a well off person in St. Petersburg or Moscow, for some rural folks it's basically years of salary. In a single month.

    That partially why the MOD gets recruits even still. It's a fantastic social and economic ladder.

    If you're from an impoverished background you get a high salary as well as loads of other perks.

    That pipeline has existed for ages now, there's a reason why military youth camps and stuff do very well in Buryat.


    Russian recruitment ad


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  • Konrad:

    This week's general outlook will be different. As some of you may know, two weeks ago, Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, Franz-Stefan Gady, and I went to Ukraine for our second field trip study to learn more about the war, its direction and general trends. Below is the list of my impressions from this trip.

    I am not going to attribute any specific statement to a particular person, but for clarity, when in Kyiv, we met frontline soldiers, drone operators, units commanders, a military branch commander, NGOs representatives, and diplomatic personnel:

    1. The battle for Bakhmut is increasingly unpopular among Ukrainian soldiers. There is little understanding behind the political-military leadership's decision to hold the town. Although defensive positions were set up west of the city, no indications were there suggesting that they would be used soon;

    2. We assess an internal struggle within the Ukrainian political-military leadership. Zelensky is at odds with General Zaluzhny (Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces), while General Syrsky (Ground Forces Commander) is the president's protégé. Zaluzhny's presence in the reported meeting with Syrksy and Zelensky last week was probably to sanction the continued defence of Bakhmut and show unity within the command structures.

    3. Ukrainian losses are significant. Over the past month, we assess that the ratio is Ukrainian to Russian losses stood at 1:1 or 1:2. In some areas and days. It may have even been greater. The battle greatly attires Ukrainian units, while the impact on Russian military formations is tiny. The battle for Bakhmut is mostly done by Wagner fighters supported by Russian 106th Airborne Division elements. So Ukrainians are attiring Wagner, while Wagner is attiring Ukrainian ground forces.

    4. Ukrainians are fighting with entire brigades, not with battalions detached from these brigades;

    5. However, we also need to stress Russian artillery expenditure, which is very high. Thus, one could claim that another point of holding Bakhmut is forcing Russians to use up as many shells as possible, which will hinder its operations throughout spring. As of last week, the ratio in artillery fires stood at 1:5.

    6. Ukrainians suffer heavy casualties in the city's northern parts, which features no basements. It is difficult for the defenders to maintain their defensive positions, and they are very susceptible to artillery strikes;

    7. There were two weeks' worth of supply in the city if it were to be cut off.

    8. Russians use aviation over Bakhmut, but only at night. Polish Piorun MANPAD is the only tool available to engage aviation after sunset.

    9. There are two Wagner forces. Convicts man one, and they are essentially an expandable force. Their objective is to move forward; unless they are severely wounded, it would be better if they didn't return. Often they are used as a breaching force.

    10. The second Wagner is a well-trained and well-equipped force with a very flexible approach in offence and defence. They are equipped with thermal cameras, night-vision goggles and any equipment necessary for urban warfare;

    11. Wagner assault force involves four groups: two assault, one support and one evacuation. Altogether, some 56-64 men.

    12. Wagner was indeed cut off from artillery supplies, but this issue was solved when the organisation started fighting along the 106th Airborne Division;

    13. EW is a problem, but Ukrainian assets increasingly suffer from their own systems;

    14. Ukrainians are preparing for a counteroffensive. During the previous visit to Ukraine, we were told three army corps were being established to facilitate the breakthrough. Ukrainians are indeed progressing with this process, but we obtained no exact data on their force structure;

    15. Ukrainian high-rank commanders increasingly get involved in making tactical decisions;

    16. The current war is a war of reservists. The core of both armies is not destroyed (killed), and the quality of their reserve force will be key in how the war develops; At the same time, both commands are increasingly focused on Soviet-era operations, and there appears to be little appreciation for flexibility and decentralised command and control;

    17. Nevertheless, both forces innovate. For instance, Russians use Lancet UAVs for counterbattery fire; Lancet strikes on M777s do not render them irreparable;

    18. We are probably behind the peak point of Western military supplies to Ukraine. Although more equipment will undoubtedly come (Leopards, Abrams, Patriot, etc.), the number of pieces of equipment the west can offer to Ukraine is increasingly small;

    19. Both Ukrainians and Russians suffer from shell hunger, but Russians generally enjoy the preponderance of force. However, not everywhere. With the focus on Bakhmut, as stated above, the artillery ratio stands 1:5, but near Vuhledar, it is closer to 1:1. Russians need to prioritise as well;

    20. As a side note, after the trip to Ukraine, we went to Brussels for a Track 2 conversation about Russian nuclear and conventional policies over the next 5-10 years. There, we heard about an increasing number of voices which oppose the remilitarisation of Europe as "Russia is already militarily defeated". So what's the point of rebuilding and expanding national defence capabilities if Russia is no longer the threat

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    Quote
    Latest @KofmanMichael podcast is, as usual, well worth a listen. "The Russian military is, in some respects, doing the Ukrainian armed forces a favour by exhausting themselves ahead of [the] anticipated Ukrainian offensive." Notes below:https://t.co/MgvQ5Sa4zZ
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    Bakhmut: Casualty ratio still favourable to Ukraine, but much less so since December as Russia has taken flanks, especially to north of city. Ukraine good at mobile defence. Fixed trenches etc not to Ukraine's advantage. Much better, higher ground west of of city.
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    Bakhmut: "travelling around the front you hear a lot of grumbling where folks aren't sure whether reason they're holding Bakhmut is because it's politically important..impression is they're trying to hold on to it, at least until ... they launch their offensive operation"
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    "Wagner is throwing PMCS...recruited from prisons to soften up Ukrainian positions & identify them. Wagner is deeply embedded & integrated with 106th airborne division (VDV) from the Russian side, which is supporting them & supporting their advances", incl artillery support.
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    "what's happening [in Bakhmut] is that Ukr forces are not just facing human wave attacks [but] a pretty flexible & adaptive force that's also backed by [VDV] that is slowly trying to eat away positions on the flanks. That's why the battle is...much more challenging than appears"
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    "It sets expectations, at least for me is that there isn't going to be sort of one major offensive. We have to maybe perhaps disabuse ourselves of the notion that there's going to be some major Guderian ... manoeuvre warfare type thrust." Instead: "series of bite-and-holds".
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
    Quote
    " I think the challenge is the [Ukr] military is any coordination at the battalion level and above, and it does have challenges in in being able to orchestrate major offensive operations. That inherently lends it to leverage artillery—to be more of an artillery Army."
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    "the impression I get from talking to soldiers at different levels is that many of the best people had been lost...Many of the folks who are trained by NATO between 2014 and 22, had been lost too. A lot of junior leaders have either been lost or have been rotated up and promoted"
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    Ammo. "it's going to be incumbent on the west to provide Ukraine was much ammunition as they can ahead of this offensive...decisive period of the war in terms of Ukraine being able to achieve their objectives is coming. And it's probably sometime between the spring and summer."
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    Ukr gaps. "there's important capabilities they don't have whether it's ISR, beyond a certain range, beyond what ... off the shelf drone systems ... whether it's breaching equipment." Suggests one reason for inability to push post-Kharkiv could have been lack of bridging equipment
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
    Quote
    Kofman describes "rifts with senior officers and many officers that [came] back into the ranks that had been in reserve or had retired since 2014, and a lot of brigade level or staff-level officers intermingling with a force that had been used to fighting a certain way..."
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    Kofman: "the Ukrainian military is building out three army corps...comprised of a sizeable mix of mechanised infantry, armour, artillery brigades & supporting units." One might be reserve corps. Personnel set aside. Each bgde equipped w/ one type of equip (e.g. Bradley, Strykers)
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    Kofman: "It goes without saying that Zaluzhny, the commander in chief, is quite popular and charismatic [nb: https://t.co/v5vxUApQH7]. And what I would say is that my impression is that Syrsky [commander of land forces; https://t.co/rDCRpFfvuI] is a lot less so"
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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    Kofman: "Bottom line, I think Ukraine is building out a sizeable force. I think that force has real potential." But rather than big bang, possible "it'll be a series of sort of lurches, or offensive actions that span from the spring, all the way to the summer", more like Kherson.
    Shashank Joshi (@shashj) March 14, 2023
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  • Full statement from the US European command on the incident between Russian Su-27 and an American MQ-9 drone in the black sea

    "This unsafe and unprofessional act by the Russians nearly caused both aircraft to crash"https://t.co/VazXUuTOJp pic.twitter.com/vMMyCKbl2m

    — Faytuks News ? (@Faytuks) March 14, 2023


    EUCOM OFFICIAL STATEMENT

    “Two Russian Su-27 aircraft conducted an unsafe and unprofessional intercept with a U.S.

    Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance unmanned MQ-9 aircraft that was operating within international airspace over the Black Sea today.

    At approximately 7:03 AM (CET), one of the Russian Su-27 aircraft struck the propeller of the MQ-9, causing U.S. forces to have to bring the MQ-9 down in international waters.

    Several times before the collision, the Su-27s dumped fuel on and flew in front of the MQ-9 in a reckless, environmentally unsound and unprofessional manner. This incident demonstrates a lack of competence in addition to being unsafe and unprofessional.

    "Our MQ-9 aircraft was conducting routine operations in international airspace when it was intercepted and hit by a Russian aircraft, resulting in a crash and complete loss of the MQ-9," said U.S. Air Force Gen. James B. Hecker, commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe and Air Forces Africa. "In fact, this unsafe and unprofessional act by the Russians nearly caused both aircraft to crash."

    "U.S. and Allied aircraft will continue to operate in international airspace and we call on the Russians to conduct themselves professionally and safely, Hecker added.

    This incident follows a pattern of dangerous actions by Russian pilots while interacting with U.S. and Allied aircraft over international airspace, including over the Black Sea. These aggressive actions by Russian aircrew are dangerous and could lead to miscalculation and unintended escalation.”
  • Russian MoD disputes US Air Force’s version on the MQ-9 reaper drone which crashed into the Black Sea.


    Moscow says the drone crashed into the water as a result of “quick manoeuvring” after Su-27 jets were scrambled to intercept it.


    “The Russian aircraft did not use on-board weapons, did not come into contact with the unmanned aerial vehicle.”

  • Drone view of a CQB trench fight. At 1:28 a Russian oopski's his buddy.


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