Ukraine War thread.

Prigozhin claims Wagner lost 62,000 in Bakhmut alone.

Add that to what the Russian army lost and Ukraine's estimate of 100k seems about right.

Current estimate of 235,000 is probably correct.

Jay in Kyiv (@JayinKyiv) July 19, 2023

The US has information indicating Russia laid additional sea mines in approaches to Ukrainian ports, White House NSC spox said.

"We believe that this is a coordinated effort to justify any attacks against civilian ships in the Black Sea and lay blame on Ukraine"

(Reuters)

Status-6 (@Archer83Able) July 19, 2023

"The country is on the verge of an inflationary catastrophe". Russia faces the strongest price hike since the beginning of the war

The summer devaluation of the ruble, which brought the Russian currency into the top 3 weakest in the world and made it the world leader in terms of volatility, promises the Russian economy the strongest acceleration in inflation since the beginning of the war.

Retailers and distributors of goods ranging from beverages to cars and household appliances are preparing to raise prices at a double-digit pace after the dollar rose to 90 rubles and the euro broke the 100 mark.

The price increase was announced by car dealers (15-20%), juice and soda producers (10-20%), household appliances and gadgets suppliers (10-20%), air carriers and travel agencies (up to 40%).

The situation is exacerbated by the rapid rise in freight prices. Because of the sanctions in Russia, there was a shortage of trucks, and mobilization provoked a shortage of drivers. As a result: transportation of goods in Russia has become more expensive by 38% since the beginning of the year.

“The country is on the verge of a major inflationary catastrophe,” write MMI analysts: the devaluation of the ruble has caused inflation expectations to rise among consumers, they spend more, and this “significantly increases inflationary pressure.”

Rosstat estimates the current inflation modestly - 3.6%, which is 5 times lower than the record values for 20 years in April 2022. But the weekly rate of price growth is creeping up: 0.18% for July 11-17 against 0.14% and 0.15% in the previous two weeks.

The effect of the devaluation will inevitably last for a long time: even if the ruble strengthens, importers will include higher levels of exchange rates in their prices, warns Yegor Susin, managing director of GPB Private Banking.

https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/14389

The commander of the campaign against Moscow thanked the Wagnerites for their glory all over the world

The commander of the Wagner PMC, Dmitry Utkin, whose call sign gave the company its name, thanked the mercenaries who, after the rebellion, agreed to move to Belarus. In a video shared by PMC-affiliated channels, he greeted the fighters who were given the PMC flag from the Molkino military training ground near the city of Goryachiy Klyuch near Krasnodar.

“Yes, if someone does not know, I am the same Wagner. Most of you know me. I know most of you personally. Many thanks to everyone for the work done, thanks to this work, damn it, the name of Wagner PMC has thundered all over the world. Thanks to all. Guys, thank you very much. You have a new stage ahead of you. This is not the end, this is only the beginning of the biggest work in the world that will be done very soon. Well, welcome to hell (“Welcome to hell.” - TMT),” summed up Utkin.

The founder of the military company, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was present in the same video, said that the mercenaries fought with dignity and did a lot for Russia. “Now what is happening at the front is a shame in which we do not need to participate. And wait for the moment when we can prove ourselves in full. Therefore, it was decided that we will be here in Belarus for some time,” Prigozhin said.

https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/14386


PMC "Wagner" will send thousands of recruited prisoners home

The command of the private military company "Wagner" allowed the prisoners who were recruited for the war in Ukraine to return home, write "Important stories". The publication studied messages in private chats associated with PMCs. It turned out that at present the Wagner convicts are in the hotels of Anapa, awaiting pardon. Most are going to be released on the day the contract ends, but some will be allowed to leave earlier.

“My husband called and said that within a week they would all be sent home, a pardon had come. Even those whose contract ends in August will still go home earlier. This is about those who are from the IR,” writes the wife of one of the mercenaries.

Now former prisoners live in the village of Vityazevo - in the Relax, Cactus and Calypso hotels. A day here costs up to 7200 rubles. In one of the chats, they reported that there are now about 400 Wagnerites in hotels, they are not allowed to leave the hotel territory. Some of the former prisoners lead a wild life.

Relatives of the four mercenaries confirmed to reporters that all prisoners would be released from their hotels to go home after receiving a pardon. One of the interlocutors said that if they wish, they will be able to extend the contract with PMCs in order to go to Belarus or Africa.

https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/14388

Along the lines of Russian strikes on Uke wheat exporting facilities

Russia has stolen up to 500,000 tons of Ukrainian wheat, worth $100 million, since Russia’s invasion

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/0…e-grain-russia-sales.html

In response to Russia saying all shipping to UA will be considered fair game..

Wagner leadership and losses

Strelkov/Girkin


They found something to brag about, idiots .... Losses in 3/4 of the personnel (out of 78 thousand - 22 + 40 thousand wounded were killed). Yes, for such "Pyrrhic victories" (which, in addition, have no strategic significance) should be demoted to ordinary commanders. Complete professional failure...

Representatives of PMC "Wagner" told how many people were recruited to participate in the SVO in Ukraine and what suffered losses. One of the commanders of the PMC, the chief of staff of "Marks", said that a total of 78 thousand mercenaries passed during the "Ukrainian assignment". Of these, 49 thousand are prisoners from various correctional colonies of the Russian Federation. On May 20, 22,000 mercenaries were killed and 40,000 wounded. "Alive and healthy, 25 thousand remained, plus the wounded and those who are being treated. Of these, up to 10 thousand have left and are leaving for Belarus," said Marx.

https://t.me/strelkovii/6150

Also Russians not happy about cluster munitions used on them

Quote

???? “At the moment, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are demolishing our positions on the Bakhmut direction of cluster munitions. Counter-battery wrestling doesn't work. Everything is burning all around. The men are holding on, waiting aviation. The General Staff has not yet handed… pic.twitter.com/PEFZVIhd9x
— Cloooud |\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GloOouD) July 20, 2023

The General Staff has not yet handed over to our guys cassette

bombs and rockets with cluster munitions for answers.

It remains only to believe in our guys and our pilots.” – Russian TG Channel

BTW I confirm information about cluster ammunition)))

Maybe soon we will publish more information

Quote

At least 8 ammunition bunkers (along with numerous vehicles) were destroyed in yesterday's strike on a Russian army base near Staryi Krym, #Crimea... pic.twitter.com/1SwEOSZGYx
The Intel Crab (@IntelCrab) July 21, 2023

Excavator becomes an ex cavator

Russia said it will target Rheinmetall plant (once built) in Ukraine.  Rheinmetall says it will defend the plant with its own weapon systems.


Ukrainian staff at ZNPP refuse order to move one unit from cold shutdown to warm shutdown, possibly indicating the Russians want to bring a unit on line again.

UA kamikaze hits probably manned T90 with uncertain results

Very interesting.  What appears to be a genuine massed-fire mission against occupied Bakhmut, not cluster munitions.  10 or 11 near-simultaneous hits.  Probably new footage.

40 more spartan APCs to Ukraine

Drone view of several dead and dying Russians.  My guess is from the mystery attack we’re seeing disjointed snippets of.

Swedish bandwagen supply tractor.  Crazy mobility!

Captured (stuck) T-72

Not sure what did this.  Maybe JDAM?

Three HMMVS landing an infantry assault under artillery fire.  Those guys are nuts.


Reported as “cluster munition” but doesn't look like DPICM.  Looks more like that Israeli 120mm mortar cluster munition.

copy and paste some summaries of two podcasts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee did.

Russia is defending in a highly competent manner along the front. They were caught completely unprepared during the Kharkiv offensive and learned many lessons from that. Southern lines are entrenched at the divisional and even combined arms army level.

. They're fighting according to doctrine (multiple layers of minefields and trenches, presighted artillery, frontline troops have lots of AT weapons, semi-regular counterattacks, echeloned lines) but employing even more mines than doctrine calls for. They're mixing AT and AP mines, double or even triple stacking AT mines to knock out Ukrainian mine rolling vehicles, and specifically targeting Ukrainian engineering vehicles. They also regularly disperse new mines with their MLRS delivery vehicles, including behind lines Ukrainians have taken, especially roads used to resupply Ukrainian forces.

. Russia is working hard to mitigate the weaknesses of their lower quality units. They have "expendable" troops holding first line trenches and less important areas, bolstered by higher quality units who are holding key parts of the line and used to launch counterattacks. Spetsnaz are being used extensively I'm this role, and are highly effective with ATGMs. By mixing units, lower quality forces are less likely to break. Marine infantry and more highly trained Motorized rifle units are also being used in similar role.

. The mystery of why Ukraine didn't press Russian forces harder during Kherson withdrawal was answered, it was because Russia used tons of mines there as well. Some of the last equipment that they withdrew were mine-laying MLRS vehicles.

. Russia is noticeably conserving artillery usage, giving Ukraine a relative but not decisive advantage in tube artillery. Russia still has an advantage in MLRS though Ukraine likely has an advantage in PGMs and long range precision strikes. Kofman stresses that overall Ukrainian fires advantage is not decisive and its limited by their supply of munitions from the West.

. Ukraine has serious misteps in first days of the offensive, which were costly. Ukraine has a mix of newly raised "NATO-trained and equipped" units and more experienced units fighting in the South. The experienced units have taken most of the ground Ukraine has captured thus far.

. Ukraine's big gamble in this offensive was forming those brand new "NATO" brigades. During Russian Winter offensive, Ukraine used highly experienced units like the 93rd Mechanized and 3rd Assault Brigade to hold off the Russian offensive while new brigades were formed. They suffered significant losses and weren't able to rest and refit before this offensive as a result. Unfortunately the newly formed "NATO" brigades haven't lived up to expectations and have underperformed thus far. Importantly, the whole units were brand new, including support, artillery, and infantry formations. As such, there's a seeming lack of unit cohesion among these new units and the accelerated training timeline didn't give them enough time to learn capabilities of new equipment or how best to employ them in combined arms operations.

. The first days of the offensive revealed a number of issues with the new brigades related to reconnaissance of their routes and for their artillery, poor coordination with neighboring units, trouble finding the right targets, problems with engineering, poor coordination with the units whose positions they were taking (i.e. where minefields and terrain features were located), some units got lost at night and others didn't travel down lanes that been cleared of mines. One brigade's advance was apparently delayed by several hours and instead of attacking at night using their superior night fighting capabilities, they attacked at dawn instead. This delay also meant that the Russian units who had been bombarded by Ukrainian artillery were no longer suppressed when they did advance, leading to heavy losses from ATGMs. There was also a lack of a proper "Plan B" once they started running into these issues. Most of these problems wouldn't have occurred with more experienced units.

. In the first days of the offensive, mines were a problem but the advance was really more blunted by Russian artillery and ATGMs. The failures of these new units in the first days of the offensive squandered the Ukrainian element of surprise and gave them precious time to react.

. They are very clearly referring to the shitshow that was the assault by the 47th Brigade, where they lost multiple Leopards, Bradleys, and engineering vehicles.

. Kofman: Ukraine has proven itself highly skilled on the defense, but its struggled offensively the whole war, especially at scaling up operations beyond the company level. This offensive, while using brigades on paper, was handled more as a series of company or reinforced company-level assaults launched largely independent of one another

. The counteroffensive was practically prosecuted by company-sized elements. This resulted from the Ukrainian military's struggles with coordinating actions above the battalion level. The military tends to rely on sequencing rather than coordination and struggles to deal with setbacks.

. Dearth of experienced officers and veterans as a result of losses and massive expansion of the army. Leaders were unwilling to give up valuable personnel for staffing the new brigades. Stars who did go came with drawbacks of their own--see 47th Brigade. New brigades struggled to attract talent due to these factors.

. Need to take a critical look at the idea of standing up wholly new brigades as opposed to having continued to work and train within existing forces. More experienced brigades have shown better results than newer force organizations across all three theaters. The jury is still out on the new brigades, but the concept needs scrutiny.

. "You go to war with the army you have", but you also have to use the army you have, not the army you would like to have. Ukraine relies on artillery fires to enable their maneuver. Trying to adapt to a radically different doctrine put the Ukrainian military in a difficult position. Western maneuver doctrine has advantages but does not necessarily work for Ukraine given what they have available.

. Pulling back veterans for counteroffensive training, then supplementing them with newer troops as support would have been a better strategy, even if doing so means pulling out of Bakhmut quicker.

. The early hours of the counteroffensive were crucial--most artillery, least prepared Russian forces, etc., etc. Veteran brigades might have been able to push through the stumbling blocks that derailed the newer personnel that were at the tip of the spear.

. Rob Lee offers a bit of nuance to a surprisingly unambiguous Kofman. There is no risk-free option here. If Ukraine had tried to pull back veteran units over the winter, there's a real possibility that they would have lost more terrain elsewhere.

. This is a very good Russian defense. Even with veteran brigades and fully equipped troops, it's not clear that the counteroffensive could have reached all the way to Melitopol, or even to the main defensive line. No guarantee the alternative would

. Back to Kofman. Against such a prepared defense, a combined arms offensive was unlikely to succeed without enabling factors like air superiority. In fact, even most Western militaries lack the resources to perform such an operation without the US leading the way in the integrating role.

. The offensive is far from over. Just because the initial offensive was unsuccessful, doesn't mean the whole offensive will be a failure. New brigades have combat experience, will make changes. There is going to be tactical adaptation.

. Ukrainian fighting is dependent on infantry advances. Platform-based demining is less important than man-portable demining equipment. Present Ukrainian techniques clear narrow lanes that choke logistics and cannot permit vehicles. Infantry systems like APOBs would be much more effective and efficient.

. Current fires are not meant to pull apart command and control, though some Storm Shadows have been used to that effect Attrition has worked for Ukraine in the past. and it may work here.

. Don't expect mechanized maneuver to make a sudden appearance anytime soon. Ukrainian tankers have learned that massing armor is a lethal mistake. Most tanks on both sides are used in indirect fire and infantry support roles. Anti-tank roles are carried out by infantry and artillery. Tanks operate in pairs, one firing and the other providing overwatch and support. Tank brigades seem to be nascent and not present in this fight. Even a substantial breakthrough will struggle to gain momentum. Western expectations of how Ukraine will employ its forces don't align with Ukrainian takeaways from the last year and a half of war.

. Rob Lee: Relative attritional balances are hard to predict from OSINT data. The side on the offensive tends to take heavier losses and that is likely true in this case, but open source data on losses shows clear successes in Ukrainian counterbattery and high-value targeting. Ukrainian ability to field UAVs behind Russian lines is a positive sign. But a significant breakthrough is far from guaranteed.

. Russia has enough UAVs to maintain constant overwatch of the frontline. Able to interdict masses of armor. Lower fires does not necessarily mean Russia is running out of shells--they are holding them in reserve for when they see the most threat.

. Terrain is very good for observation and therefore long-range ATGMs. Russian helicopters and glide bombs are another pain point.

. Infantry advances reduce casualties, but slow everything down. Places a heavy burden on individual soldiers due to the inability for vehicles to penetrate with infantry. 47th Brigade has begun advancing after pivoting to infantry advance, but this is measured in hundreds of meters.

. The major constraint is artillery ammunition. If there is not a quick enough advance, Ukraine will run out of shells before they reach their objectives.

. Ukraine continues to hold an advantage in small squad tactics.

. Kofman: DPICMs are all about the numbers. Buys the Ukrainian army time to fight into the fall. Sense is that Ukrainians are determined, learning. They are nasty weapons, but there is no other stockpile to be given to Ukraine.

. Just because the West stops giving Ukraine the capacity to stop the war, does not mean that Russia will suddenly stop the war. If anything, they will try to press their advantage even harder. The position that Ukraine should get Western support until the first unsuccessful offensive does not make any sense.

. Ukraine needs nightfighting capabilities, man-portable capabilities, and to push those things all the way down, even to units that may not be part of the traditional army structure like National Guard.

https://t.me/ssternenko/18556

Girkin was arrested in Russia. He is accused of extremism under Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

In one of the issues recently, I predicted that Girkin would be arrested, because after Prigozhin's rebellion, the Russian authorities see a threat in anyone who criticizes them.

https://t.me/strelkovii/6161



Miroslava Reginskaya, wife of Igor Strelkov:


Today, at about 11:30, representatives of the investigative committee came to us. I was not at home at that time. Soon, according to the concierge, they took my husband under the arms and took him away in an unknown direction.

From friends, I managed to find out that my husband was charged under article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (extremism).

I do not know anything about the whereabouts of my husband, he did not get in touch.

At the time of my arrest, I was not at home.

Darth Putin

@DarthPutinKGB

Day 513 of my 3 day war. Prigozhin mutinied and got a meeting with me. Girkin condemned the mutiny and he’s in jail.

I remain a master strategist.

Copy / paste of another guys summary which seems on point.

Warning: another large post incoming. This will be a summary of Michael Kofman and Rob Lee's latest episode of the Russian Contingency podcast, mixed with some of my own personal commentary. I found this to be a little more upbeat than the previous one.

. There is always a focus on large, high-tech items for equipping units of the formal Ukrainian military. However, what the Ukrainians need are low-tech, basic armored vehicles like the M113 for back-line roles. Similarly, Ukrainian TDF and National Guard units are often underequipped, despite holding the front against Russian assaults just like regular Army units. Quantity of basic equipment is very important for resolving these issues. Personal commentary: This is why I'm happy to see talk of the Ukrainians getting M60s/Challenger 1s, and it's also why I've advocated for starting BTR-4 production on Poland. The Ukrainians need quantity more than anything right now.

. There are no wunderwaffen. Conflicts come down to force employment, force qualities, and force enablers - these are the sources of Ukrainian challenges thus far. Personal commentary: I had a suspicion back when I read about how long the west was training these new Ukrainian brigades that it wouldn't be even remotely enough for them to pull of Western (read: American) style combined arms. I'm still preferable to the idea of forming multiple new Ukrainian brigades and training them up in Poland for extended periods of time, preferably built around experienced Ukrainian NCOs and officers.

. Ukraine has had more success around Bakhmut, despite the presence of higher quality Russian units there. Kofman mentions in particular the 31st Air Assault Brigade, which has apparently been pulled off the front lines. However, there are a large variety of Russian units in the area.

. Bakhmut is like a punch bowl surrounded by higher ground. Russia continues to hold some of this high ground, but Ukrainian advances have imperiled those. Russian entrenchments here are much less elaborate than those in the south. Highly motivated and coordinated veteran units are the backbone of Ukraine's assault here. Personal commentary: I lean towards thinking that those very good Ukrainian brigades in the area would be put to better use in the south. Bakhmut still doesn't matter very much strategically, but I suppose it's a good thing that they're killing some high quality Russian soldiers there now instead of Wagner convicts.

. Russia's problems around Bakhmut started when they took the city. Wagner bore the brunt of the fighting and casualties to take the city, but Bakhmut is exceedingly difficult to defend as well. The reason it took Russia so long to take it was because of its failure to encircle the city with dismounted infantry (Kofman makes a direct comparison here between Russia's struggles in Vuhledar and Bakhmut and Ukraine's struggles in Zaporizhia). Russia is struggling to hold a defensively unfavorable location and losing higher quality troops in the process. Personal commentary: Russia now seems to be in the same position Ukraine was in regarding Bakhmut. In light of all of this, I really do think that the smarter play would've been for Ukraine to withdraw from Bakhmut earlier.

. Bakhmut was not a trap for Russian forces. Rather, this counteroffensive on the part of Ukraine is simultaneously a fixing operation and a manifestation of political objectives. In the process, however, Ukraine is killing a lot of Russian airborne troops, which have been Moscow's strategic reserve in this conflict. Almost all of the naval infantry is on the southern front, and almost all of the airborne infantry/VDV are on the eastern front.

. The attrition rate is overall favorable for Ukraine. However, Russia has a lot of artillery fires still, and these fires are being concentrated on Ukrainian advances. They key issue for Ukraine is generating and sustaining momentum while suffering losses. Personal commentary: This is why I think quality training (which increasingly doesn't appear to be what the newly formed Ukrainian "NATO" brigades got) and large numbers of equipment are of the utmost importance. They need the training and the metal to advance, sustain losses, and keep moving forward so as to bust through Russian defenses.

. Wagner mutiny further increases political importance of Bakhmut. Wagner and supporters would be empowered by further Ukrainian advances in the area.

. Ukrainians may need to commit further resources in order to continue advancing. Both sides may end up too attrited to continue further offensive operations in the area. Personal commentary: I wouldn't commit any more troops to Bakhmut. There's advantages to killing Russian airborne troops in the area, but I think additional Ukrainian metal and manpower would be better put to use in the south.

. Steady pace of dismissals of Russian commanders may be relevant as Russia increasingly begins to look towards a rotation. Rotation of units could substantially affect their ability to defend as units are replaced with less experienced, mobilized personnel who may be less familiar with the terrain. In addition, some units from the south will likely have to be diverted to Bakhmut. However, the south will continue to be heavily defended. Ukraine's strategy of advancing on three fronts creates pressure, forces Russia to make choices, and eventually may lead to a breakthrough. Taking Bakhmut itself does not lead to much. Personal commentary: Taking Bakhmut itself is largely meaningless at this point. It's surrounded by high ground, and if the Ukrainians retook it, they'd be in the same position the Russians are in now. Eating away at the flanks around the city, killing quality Russian soldiers, and forcing them to divert resources from the south would seem to be the best option here.

. Dealing with attrition and recovering force quality are key battlefield enablers. Key aspect of this is making the choice to attrite or preserve units in the first place, as with Ukraine's original choice to defend Bakhmut. One argument one could make is that this denied Ukraine the ability to take veterans from those brigades and deploy them in the south. The moment Russia took Bakhmut, however, the balance shifted, and now Bakhmut is an opportunity for Ukraine to inflict attrition on Russian units. Territorial movements may be modest but offensive may succeed in sapping Russian capabilities for offensive action in the future. Personal commentary: This is the best I've felt about Ukraine's actions around Bakhmut in a long, long time.

. There's a pretty wide range of Russian units in the south, ranging from Storm Z (convicts), to mobilized, to naval infantry, to Spetsnaz, etc. Attrition to some of these groups is more sustainable than others, and it's difficult to assess which Russian units are getting hit the hardest from OSINT. Ukraine has an advantage in tubed artillery, while Russia has an advantage in rocket artillery. Russian advances may be stymied by lack of an artillery overmatch. Personal commentary: Russia's decreasing artillery advantage pretty much renders gains like we saw during the Donbas salient campaign last summer an impossibility. It remains to be seen how much more of their territory the Ukrainians can liberate, but I don't think the Russians are going much further.

. Ukraine has enough artillery shells for this offensive, but what about after? The US and the EU have not scaled up ammunition production sufficiently to match Ukraine's monthly use rate. Ukraine has been supplied from stockpiles, but this is not an infinite resource. Artillery ammunition supplies may very well be the most important facet of this war for both sides. Personal commentary: What the fuck are we doing??? Ramping up 155mm production should've happened yesterday.

. Russian fires will also be restricted as their stockpiles run out. Kofman makes a "wild" guess at Russia being able to produce about a million artillery shells of their most common caliber per year. This was dramatically constrict their fire rates. Ukrainian fires still cannot come from quantity, though, they have to make up the difference with quality.

. Ukrainian infantry are noticeably better than Russian infantry up to the company level. As long as they have the supplies, they'll generally overperform expectations. That hasn't been the case in the past five weeks of the offensive, however. Russia is fighting much more competently than before. Personal commentary: It was only a matter of time until the Russians learned and got better. I think they learned some serious lessons from Kharkiv and Kherson last year.

. Pressure to negotiate comes up against the questions of, "With who and what?" Russia has shown no signs that they're willing to negotiate. Russia is unlikely to give up any of the territory it has formally annexed, and Ukraine has no reason to consider accepting that. A premature peace will probably just be an interlude until a third war breaks out. Battlefield developments have not led either side to feel like they need to make concessions. This is already a long war, and it's likely to go on, even after the decisive phase of the war has passed. Personal commentary: It's obvious that any settlement that ends in Russia taking significantly more territory will just be a prelude to round three (2014 was round one). If this war ends that way, we have to pump Ukraine full of weapons to make round three as decisive for Ukraine as possible.

. Military sustainment and Western will are very critical. Ukrainians are willing to take any vehicles at all. Even Toyota Hiluxes will do, but extra protection is in particularly short supply. Much of this is ultimately out of Ukraine's control.

. Every time Ukraine has had to retreat, it's been due to a Russian dominance in artillery fires. As long as Ukraine has supplies of artillery shells, further Russian advances remain pretty unlikely. Personal commentary: If it wasn't for Russia's Cold War stocks of artillery ammo, they'd have lost this war already. The only reason they took as much as they did during the height of their advance last summer was an absolutely MASSIVE advantage in artillery fires.

. DPICMs have risks, but they are particularly good for disrupting Russian armor concentrations.

. Be careful when it comes to anecdotal evidence. Mobilization has resulted in a flurry of embarrassing stories for Russia - appeal videos, mass shootings, etc. However, mobilization also saved Russia's ass in this war and allowed them to hold their lines. Without it, they may very well have lost by now. Despite some truly horrific anecdotes about mobilization, there's minimal domestic pressure to end the war. Domestic upheaval is possible, however, and would have major impacts on the war.

. NATO/US must take a longer view of things. The war is likely to go on for one or more years. It may be a good idea to pull some veterans off the front lines and send them abroad for lengthy, extended training. Personal commentary: Yes, this is what I want to see happen. Maybe pull some Azov/Kraken/Dnirpo-1 guys off the front and put them in charge of training new soldiers, too.

. Shoigu and Gerasimov have not done very well at all and do not command much respect in the Russian military. One of the side effects of the mutiny is that Putin cares more about loyalty than he did before. Seliverstov was removed despite his competence, possibly because he worked closely with Wagner, and therefore his loyalty was questionable. Russia has generally moved to more competent commanders over the course of the war, but the coup attempt threatens to reverse that trend. Surovkin is arguably responsible for Russian success - if he had not been in charge, it's possible Russia would've fared far worse. Now, his position is in jeopardy. Loss of competence in favor of loyalty is a more long-term factor for Russia.

. This offensive has not failed. The Ukrainian military has a theory of success and will fight it the way they know best from this point onwards. It will stretch out through and beyond the summer. To the extent that the west can sustain and provide the support they need, it will have real impacts.