Ukraine War thread.

Another KA 52 downed yesterday, confirmed by Russian posts. I think they have around30-40 of them left. KA 52's shooting atgms at max distance has taken out quite a few vehicles.

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Turns out that the Ka-52 crew taken down yesterday was receiving aid from volunteers, including navigation, a watch, and a camera. But that didn't help:



"Just recently, we helped this Ka-52 crew with navigation, a camera, and watches ... unfortunately, a vile missile in the back… pic.twitter.com/HJalVScPio
Dmitri (@wartranslated) August 8, 2023

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This gives Russia's mobilization potential a whole new meaning... "The most financially viable option for many Russian men is therefore to go to war, with their families standing to receive state benefits should they not return." https://t.co/sf8apkSwOd pic.twitter.com/wu4pSjbaBN
Olena Lennon (@olenalennon) August 7, 2023

Till death make us rich. For many Russians, going to war is the only way to escape poverty. Novaya-Europe delves into how the Kremlin put a price on Russian lives — Novaya Gazeta Europe

Russia may be spending as much as 850 billion rubles (€8.5 bn) a month on the war with Ukraine, according to some estimates. This incredible sum represents not…

novayagazeta.eu

A comparison of median salaries in different fields with that of an ordinary soldier shows that a father who has taken up arms can provide for his family much better than most civilians.

In addition to monthly salaries and lump sums for the families of those killed in combat, soldiers who served in the Ukraine war and their families are entitled to some 60 types of payments and non-cash benefits, according to Novaya-Europe’s research. This includes everything from regional payouts in case of injury or death (up to 3 million rubles, or €30,000) to pardons for convicts who have gone to war.

Why mobilization does not the negative social impact the west thought it would

The most financially viable option for many Russian men is therefore to go to war, with their families standing to receive state benefits should they not return. Throughout Russia, a 35-year-old man who works until his retirement at 65 can expect to earn less in that time than the benefits the families of war veterans are eligible for.

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Corroboration of the rumor of recent days: the 56th VDV Regiment (part of the 7th Division stationed in the Kherson Oblast) has allegedly been sent to the Southern front. Probably Orikhiv sector. Only the 108th Regiment and the 171st Separate Battalion, from the 7th VDV Division, are still deployed along the Dnipro. The 247th Regiment had been moved to Staromaiorske around mid July and Ukrainians often report that it's used to launch numerous small-scale counterattacks, which may suggest that it suffered not-negligible losses.

The entire Eastern Military District (including the Pacific Fleet), from what we know from open source infos, is on the frontlines from Polohy to Vuhledar: there is not a single uncommitted maneuver formation (the 57th Brigade is in the Bakhmut sector for some reason). The 35th Army's brigades in Polohy are fresh and have seen limited war actions, but Polohy area is still a contact line that the Russians may be afraid to leave undermanned without fear of Ukrainian attacks there.

As for the Southern MD, the 58th Army (probably the most capable Russian formation during this conflict) is 100% committed in the South. During recent weeks most elements of the 49th Army have been sent to the Southern front, from Kherson. In the latter sector a few brigades are still remaining (such as two from the Arctic Fleet) along with several mobilized regiments as well as, now, the minority of the 7th VDV Division, as mentioned above.

Today there was talk of clashes at Kozachi Laheri; personally I am still bearish about the feasibility of maintaining a sizeable Ukrainian bridgehead across the Konka River. Russia still has reserves in the area and the risks of a full-scale crossing attempt are too great for the Ukrainians. At the same time, there are fewer and fewer reserves because of the need for troops on the Southern front. By continuing with these small-scale "provocative" attacks employing few forces, the Ukrainians could force the Russians not to fall below a minimum amount of units deployed on the left bank of the Dnipro as a deterrent of serious Ukrainian actions, but in turn this will complicate things for Russia in the Southern front.

The fact that Russia has been constantly bringing to the Southern frontlines formations previously held in reserve while the old ones continue to remain in the same areas tells us that the latters had significant declines in operational efficiency due to the fighting and there is a widespread need to increase force density in the main directions of Ukrainian attacks. At the same time it must be said that the Ukrainians are also suffering significant losses as well.

What is going between Kupyansk and Kreminna is in the hands of the other two Russian military districts, the Western and the Central ones. Russia rarely tends to mix formations from different districts; when they do it usually happens between formations from the SMD+EMD (Velyka Novosilka now, Kherson in the second half of the last year) and WMD+CMD (Svatove now, Severodonetsk and Lyman last year), probably because they partially share leadership at high levels. Bakhmut is an exception - after Wagner's withdrawal things became so complicated for the Russians to the point that they had to send there whatever units they had available, from anywhere. Most of the W/CMD formations spent the winter and part of the spring replenishing their previous heavy losses, receiving new equipment and training in Belarus. Today their grouping is considered the strongest by Ukrainian sources. Their goal is the same as that the Ukrainians have in Bakhmut. Either reach the Oskil and occupy the entire Serebrianka Forest, or force the Ukrainians to deploy enough reserves to damage efforts in the other sectors. Ukraine has probably doubled (or almost) the number of troops in that area since May, so far that doesn't seem to have had too negative consequences for Ukraine elsewhere, but it's certainly not something the Ukrainian command has agreed to do lightly

This is probably a bit optimistic

Update on the AFU Kozachi Laheri bridgehead on the left bank of occupied Kherson, Ukraine:

There are sporadic reports that the AFU has moved past the southern part of Kozachi Laheri and are beginning to envelop Chelburda with the potential of encirclement of the orcs defending… pic.twitter.com/ZsWyJKiJSG

— OSINT (Uri) \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@UKikaski) August 9, 2023

Russians claim to have abducted around 700k kids from UA.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/08/07/i-wasnt-even-given-a-chance-to-say-goodbye-to-my-mother-new-documentary-abducted-childhood-exposes-russias-crimes-against-ukrainian-children/

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1/ The Wagner Group is reported to have effectively been kicked out of Belarus, with thousands of its remaining fighters being bussed back into Russia. The Belarusian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, is reported to have refused to finance Wagner's stay in his country. ?? pic.twitter.com/JcUJrLJiky
— ChrisO_wiki (@ChrisO_wiki) August 9, 2023

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2/ The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reports that Wagner fighters are being taken by bus from their camps in Belarus in batches of 500-600 to Voronezh, Rostov and Krasnodar in Russia. The first stage of the withdrawal has already taken place and a second will begin after 13 August. pic.twitter.com/Wst4G1qT2x
— ChrisO_wiki (@ChrisO_wiki) August 9, 2023

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3/ According to a VChK-OGPU source, Lukashenko refused to pay for Wagner's presence in Belarus and instead expected Moscow to fund it – which apparently it hasn't done. A small number of Wagnerites are expected to stay on in Belarus as military instructors.
— ChrisO_wiki (@ChrisO_wiki) August 9, 2023

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4/ Around 500 Wagner stormtroopers who survived the battle of Bakhmut are reported to have been recruited for new work in Libya. The stormtroopers are paid 240,000 rubles ($2,471) per month plus another 190,000 rubles ($1,956) monthly to serve in Libya.
— ChrisO_wiki (@ChrisO_wiki) August 9, 2023

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5/ The rest of the Wagnerites are officially described as being "sent on vacation", but there is said to be no talk about returning to Belarus. They have been ordered to stay in touch with Wagner in case new tasks are assigned. Wagner is also no longer recruiting new members.
— ChrisO_wiki (@ChrisO_wiki) August 9, 2023

he optical and mechanical plant in Sergiyev Posad produced special purpose equipment

These included aviation sights, thermal imagers, homing missile heads, laser-type detection units, and optical observation devices.

It also manufactured night vision goggles, sights,… https://t.co/Y7Ku0iO2e7 pic.twitter.com/pqoRjxEyjd

— NEXTA (@nexta_tv) August 9, 2023